The assassination of Asanuma Inejirо̄ refers to the murder of Asanuma Inejirо̄ (浅沼稲次郎) during a speech he made at Tokyo Metropolitan Hibiya Public Hall in Chiyoda, Tokyo by right-wing 17 year old Yamaguchi Otoya (山口二矢) on October 12, 1960.

1 Background

2 Response from the government

3 Impact on politics and business

4 Police response

5 Media coverage

Background

On October 12, with the dissolution of the House of Representatives and general election on the horizon, party leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) gave campaign speeches at an event held at Hibiya Public Hall that was hosted by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Election Administration Commission, the Clean Election League and NHK. In order, Nishio Suehiro (Chairman of the DSP), Asanuma Inejirо̄ (Chairman of the JSP) and Ikeda Hayato (President of the LDP) were scheduled to take to the stage to address the audience of 2,500 people.

At 3pm, Asanuma stood on the stage to deliver his speech, entitled, “In support of parliamentarism,” and had barely begun when a right-wing group began jeering and handing out leaflets. Kobayashi Toshimitsu, moderator and announcer at NHK, asked the audience to show restraint, saying, “Due to the noise, I am afraid our patrons are unable to hear what is being said. Members of the newspaper media occupy most seats in the front row, and as it is too noisy for them to be able to cover this event, I ask of you to speak quietly, in order that we can resume proceedings.” His comments were met by applause and temporary cessation of the jeering.

With that, Asanuma continued his speech criticizing the LDP's election policies. “At the time of the election, they keep all the policies unpopular with citizens to themselves, so that when they win a majority...”At 3.05pm, Yamaguchi ran onto the stage and stabbed Asanuma deeply in his left side with a 33cm long wakizashi short sword [1][2], then attacked him again, with a shallow stab in the left side of Asanuma's chest. Asanuma staggered, took a few steps, then collapsed. A close aide rushed over and held him before Asanuma was taken to hospital. A private secretary looked over Asanuma's body and was relieved to see little bleeding, though in actual fact the first strike in Asanuma's left side had been over 30 centimeters deep and had severed an artery near his spine. Asanuma died quickly from severe internal bleeding, and was already dead by the time he was admitted to Hibiya Hospital at 3.40pm. According to a close aide, Asanuma died on the landing while being carried away [4].Yamaguchi was caught red-handed and arrested.

Immediately after the assassination, a number of people including Akao Satoshi (also known as Akao Bin), President of the Great Japan Patriotic Party, ran up onto the stage and protested with the moderator about the format of only three party leaders being allowed to address the audience. In addition, a man shouted, “Let the Communist Party do it too!” into the microphone. The organizers of the event lowered the curtain for an intermission. Rumors abounded that, although Asanuma was taken to hospital, his wounds were not serious [5], while various arguments arose among the organizers and political rivals, that, for example, it was unfair that Nishio and Asunuma had managed to address the audience when Ikeda had yet to do so, or that it would be unfair if Ikeda went on to address the audience when Asunuma's speech had been interrupted. Unconfirmed reports from newspaper companies that Asanuma had died reached the secretary to the Prime Minister and it was decided that the event would be canceled. A reporter from the Communist Party's newspaper Akahata presented a sound recorder to Ikeda and asked for his thoughts, although Ikeda returned to his residence without making any comment [6].

Response from the government

Comments made by the Prime Minister's Chief Secretary and the LDP Chairman for Public Relations were released as if they were made by Ikeda, even though Ikeda himself had returned to his official residence. Leaders of the LDP flocked to the Prime Minister's official residence to discuss how to deal with the situation, though on receiving information that a protest demonstration led by the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan would be marching from Hibiya to the Prime Minister's official residence, it was decided that they would move to another of Ikeda's official residences in Shinanomachi to continue discussions. Chief Cabinet Secretary Ōhira Masayoshi urged the Prime Minister to release a statement in person and swiftly dismiss whoever was in charge, though Ikeda erred on the side of caution, not wanting to do anything reckless. That evening, the Chief Cabinet Secretary released a government statement saying they would “eradicate violence” [7], and Hori Shigeru, Chairman of the General Council, held a press conference on behalf of the ruling party. The next day, after Ōhira's efforts to persuade Ikeda [8], an extraordinary cabinet meeting was called, and it was decided that Yamazaki Iwao, Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, be dismissed from his job [7]. The Public Safety Commission concluded that the police were not responsible for the incident, and as a result the Director General of the National Police Agency and the Chief of Metropolitan Police retained their positions [8].

Impact on politics and business

Before the assassination, the election had seen a complete turn around from the upheaval of the Anpo protests, with the Ikeda cabinet's economic policies such as the “income doubling plan” attracting attention, resulting in the LDP feeling secure with regards to the approaching election. The murder of Asanuma had the potential to completely change the political atmosphere. On the evening of October 12, 20,000 people gathered in protest in various parts of Tokyo calling for the Ikeda cabinet to be held accountable, even without specific orders being issued by the General Council of Trade Unions to do so, which was unusual even at the time [9]. With the Socialist Party also calling for the resignation of the Ikeda cabinet, it became the first crisis faced by the Ikeda cabinet since its inception.

When Yoshimura Katsumi, a Sankei Shimbun reporter and close friend to Ikeda, saw the moment Asanuma was stabbed on television, he feared that, should the assassination became a political issue, there would be a repeat of the turmoil seen with the Anpo protests. He visited the Ikeda residence and advised Ikeda that the extraordinary Diet session a few days later should take the form of a memorial to Asanuma, and that giving a memorial address was the best idea for Ikeda and the cabinet [10]. Ikeda took Yoshimura's advice, and in a plenary session of the House of Representatives on October 18, gave a memorial speech written by his secretary Itо̄ Masaya. It is known as a famous speech even to this day. To a certain extent, the memorial speech won over public opinion and pacified the anger of the JSP [7][11].

The Asanuma memorial speech had a great deal of significance post-war society, as it was the first opportunity for politics to take its lead from the arena of public opinion [12][7]. If the Ikeda cabinet had responded to the assassination in a heavy handed manner as had been favored by administrations up until this point, there was a possibility that the government could have collapsed [7], but instead, Ikeda's address incorporated the sense of public outcry, and it is argued that this was the first time in Japan's history that democracy had taken root [7].

On October 24, the House of Representatives was dissolved. Prime Minister Ikeda's election speech on October 31 showed a marked change from the memorial speech, taking a very aggressive stance towards the JSP [13]. At the 29^th general election of the members of the House of Representatives on November 20, the LDP were victorious, winning 300 seats, incorporating those who ran as independents and then joined the LDP. The JSP lost 23 seats to arrive at a total of 145, and did not make up for the split in the JSP that resulted in the creation of the DSP. The DSP themselves lost 23 seats and won a total of 17. As the atmosphere of mourning for Asanuma faded, the JSP slid into internal disputes over structural reform.

Ishizaka Taizо̄, Chairman of Keidanren (The Federation of Economic Organizations) and Toshiba, said, “Violence can never be good. That said, this ignorant right-wing youth had long took exception to Mr Asanuma's actions with regard to the Anpo protests and so on, and I can understand the feelings behind what he did.” These remarks resulted in Ishizaka being criticized for being sympathetic towards Yamaguchi. While being an influential supporter of the LDP, Keidanren also made small contributions to the JSP. Some argued that Keidanren should suspend contributions to the JSP after the creation of the DSP, though after Chairman Ishizaka's gaffe, it was decided that they would contribute to the DSP in addition to financially supporting the JSP.

Police response

After his arrest, Yamaguchi reportedly responded in a reasonable and straightforward manner during questioning despite his young age. On the evening of November 2, in a solitary confinement cell in a Tokyo juvenile detention center, Yamaguchi made a mixture of toothpaste power and water [14] and wrote on his cell wall, “Seven lives for my country. Long live His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor,” then hung himself. Other than Yamaguchi, the Metropolitan Police also arrested Yoshimitsu Noritoshi, 32, on suspicion of extortion; Fukuda Susumu, 32, leader of the anti-communist volunteer corps, on suspicion of false entries in originals of officially authenticated deeds and extortion; and Akao Satoshi on suspicion of forcible obstruction of business. All were involved with the right-wing organization The Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League.

The failure of bodyguards to protect Asanuma was also a big issue [15], and since that time, the philosophy of bodyguards has changed from one of inconspicuousness to being deliberately prominent and visible.

As Yamaguchi was a teenager, a movement against children being allowed access to bladed instruments began as a result of the assassination. Different blades were confiscated from children, from pencil sharpeners to higonokami (a type of folding knife used in construction), and the movement became one of the reasons for subsequent regulation on blades [16].

Media coverage

NHK sponsored the event, took part in its planning and also broadcast proceedings live on NHK Radio 1. Consequently, the entirety of the assassination was broadcast unedited to the whole country. In addition, NHK General TV, which had planned a recorded relay broadcast of the second match of the 1960 Japan Series (Taiyo Whales vs Daimai Orions at the Kawasaki Stadium) until 3.45pm, interrupted the baseball at 3.13pm with an on screen text announcement, and at 3.21pm, broadcast graphic footage from the event. At 3.43pm, after the game had finished, a special news bulletin reported the news of Asanuma's death.

Footage of the assassination was subsequently shown many times, and opinion was divided on whether it should have been broadcast. According to Sano Hirokichi, who was NHK's Executive Director of Broadcasting at the time, the decision to broadcast the video was made with an emphasis on its significance as a news event. On the same day, NHK and commercial broadcasters changed their normal programming schedules and aired special news programs. These programs condemned violence against democracy and the parliamentary system, and in strong terms called for the rejection of violence.

The assassination also affected broadcasting, accelerating a movement that had started before the assassination for the banning of violent scenes from television programs.

Nagao Yasushi, photographer for the Mainichi Shimbun, photographed Asanuma's last moments, as Asanuma's spectacles were falling from his face and Yamaguchi was poised to stab him. The photograph was distributed worldwide through United Press International, and Nagao later won the World Press Photo of the Year and became the first Japanese person to win the Pulitzer Prize [17].

The practice of recording live broadcasts via the Kinescope recording method (recording onto film with a camera trained on a video monitor showing live broadcast) was customary at the time, although NHK also preserved the original video tape recorder footage. Footage of the assassination has been used in documentaries dealing with the history of the Shо̄wa era, and scenes from minutes before the assassination were broadcast as part of a program to celebrate 30 years of broadcasting in 1983, then again in 2003, as part of a special broadcast anniversary program.

The unedited footage has been broadcast in recent years, although as Yamaguchi was a minor, media outlets have chosen to hide his name and also parts of his face.

Suzuki Kunio, founder and former representative of right-wing political group Issuikai, found out about the assassination via television news at the age of 17, the same as Yamaguchi was, and has since said it was an impetus for him to get involved with wing activities.

2020-07-26

翻訳　63 (w)

https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%A1%80%E3%81%AE%E3%83%A1%E3%83%BC%E3%83%87%E3%83%BC%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6

Bloody May Day (血のメーデー事件, chi no mēdē jiken) refers to a day of disturbances and clashes between demonstrators and police primarily at the plaza in front of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo on Thursday May 1, 1952. A number of left wing organizations are believed to have been the driving force behind the events, using the day as part of preparations for a violent revolution [1]. Bloody May Day led to the first fatality in the post-World War Two student movement.

1 Overview

2 Aftermath

Overview

Three days after the end of the Allied occupation of Japan, on May 1, 1952, at the 23^rd International Workers' Day May Day event, a number of people resolved to liberalize the plaza in front of the Imperial Palace and protest in their opposition to the rearmament of the National Police Reserve. These events also took place within an atmosphere of anti-American sentiment. The rally began around 10.20am and finished at 12.10pm, though during the rally a number of people trespassed into the plaza in front of the Imperial Palace, led by Zengakuren and others. From 12.25pm, the scheduled demonstration march course was divided into north, east, south, central and west sections. Again, many attempts were made to instigate trespass into the plaza, and a number of demonstrators drifted from the set course and threw stones. Leaders of the south course were assaulted for refusing to intrude into the plaza, resulting in some chaotic scenes. Demonstrators finally arrived in order at their scheduled destination between 2pm and 4pm before dispersing. A number of the demonstrators who had dispersed in Hibiya Park, particularly from the especially chaotic south course, were guided by Zengakuren and youths from left wing organizations and formed a scrum of around 2,500 people that also included day laborers and Koreans, which then spilled out through the main gate of Hibiya Park [2].

The Metropolitan Police Department made the decision to wait for the organizers to gain control over the march and the area, though organized 5,600 personnel to act as crowd control, and over 10,000 from all stations to be on standby and ready to respond. Around 60 people from the Marunouchi police station managed to restrain a crowd that crossed the Hibiya intersection in an unplanned demonstration, but were subject to attacks from bamboo spears, clubs and thrown stones, which left 13 people injured. Demonstrators proceeded north while throwing stones and breaking the windows of 19 foreign vehicles (owned by US Forces in Japan). The first company of the District Reserve Force and 470 reserves from Mita, Minakami and Takanawa police stations stood on guard at Babasaki gate, and other than a section of the District Reserve Force who were equipped with pistols and tear gas, they only carried batons. In an effort not to cause harm to passersby in the area, the head of the District Reserve Force lifted the cordon on the road, only for the demonstrators to surge into the plaza in front of the Imperial Palace [2][1][3].

The trespassing demonstrators started throwing stones at personnel from Marunouchi police station on guard in front of Nijūbashi Bridge and reinforcements in the form of two squadrons from the first company of District Reserve Force. The Iwaidamachi police box was pushed over and policeman were beaten and had their pistols stolen. Police units used tear gas to suppress the rioters, and around 3pm they retreated to the Chuo expressway, resulting in a stand off. At around the same time, rioters broke through police cordons at Sakura Gate and Iwaidabashi, and swelled in size to around 8,000 people. The police redeployed the Reserve Force in an effort to strengthen their position, though in response to the fierce fighting of the rioters, a number fired their pistols. In the resulting chaos, the police made a systematic effort to disperse the rioters in one go, and by 3.40pm, the majority of the rioters had been removed from the plaza [2].

Those rioters who had been removed from the plaza however continued attacks elsewhere, and at Iwaidabashi, four members of the first company of the District Reserve Force were surrounded, pummelled with poles, thrown into the Gaisen-bori Moat and had stones thrown at them. Another four members were surrounded and seemed likely to experience the same treatment, but managed to escape by firing warning shots with pistols. In addition, a number of policeman were assaulted and had their pistols stolen. Around 3.50pm, rioters turned over and set light to 14 foreign vehicles stationed at a moat in front of Sakura Gate, and also surrounded and assaulted a member of first transportation division staff who was passing through the area in a sidecar. Rioters then set fire to the sidecar. 13 of the firefighters dispatched to extinguish the fires also sustained injuries after being hit by thrown stones and physically attacked. A fire brigade hose was also cut to pieces. The rioters began to disperse around 4pm, though the Yūrakuchо̄ police box was subsequently attacked, and a number of people ran to Hibiya Park to continue throwing stones. The plaza in front of the Imperial Palace and Hibiya Park returned to calm some time after 6pm [2].

As a result of the riots, one of the demonstrators died [4] and 200 people were injured [1] (according to the organizers, two people died and 638 people were injured [2]), while on the police side, 832 people were injured (71 seriously injured) [2]. Consideration was given on the day to the deployment of the National Police Reserve (present day Ground Self Defence Force), but ultimately this was not ordered as the situation was controlled by the normal police force [5]. The reserves dispatched in this incident were part of the Reserve Force, which later became riot police.

They are not to be confused with the National Police Reserve that went on to become the Ground Self Defence Force.

Aftermath

Arrests of demonstrators totalled 1232, of which 261 were charged with rioting offences. Confrontation between the prosecution and defendants led to a protracted trial. While an initial decision made at Tokyo District Court on January 28, 1970 partially established the existence of rioting offences, an appeal court decision made by Judge Arakawa Shо̄zaburо̄ at Tokyo High Court in November 21, 1972 overturned the rioting charges, returning non-guilty verdicts in all cases other than in the instance of 16 people who were convicted of acts of violence. The prosecution subsequently decided to abandon a final appeal.

Immediately after the incident, there were intense exchanges between ruling and opposition parties in the National Diet as to who should take responsibility. In June, ineptitude in dealing with successive riots and opposition to plans to establish the Subversive Activities Prevention Act and the Maintenance of Order During Demonstration Activities Act led to a no confidence motion being put forward in Attorney General Kimura Tokutarо̄ in the House of Representatives, though this ultimately failed [6].

In the same year, 1952, other incidents occurred, such as the murder of a police officer in Sapporo known as the Shiratori incident; protests and arrests in Suida known as the Suida incident; clashes between police and protestors in Nagoya known as the О̄su incident; a politically motivated robbery known as the Akebono incident; as well as incidents called by urban guerilla organization “Core Self Defense” and rural guerilla organization “Mountain Village Operation Unit.”

The Sugо̄ incident also occurred in the same year, where members of the Communist Party were set up by security police and arrested in relation to an explosion at a police station. Five months after the incident, the Communist Party lost all their seats at the next general election. They recovered roughly the same number of seats in the 1970s.

References

https://arsof-history.org/articles/v8n1_mayday_riots_page_1.html

https://daihanrei.com/l/%E6%9D%B1%E4%BA%AC%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%E8%A3%81%E5%88%A4%E6%89%80%20%E6%98%AD%E5%92%8C%EF%BC%93%EF%BC%95%E5%B9%B4%EF%BC%88%E3%83%AF%EF%BC%89%EF%BC%93%EF%BC%97%EF%BC%95%EF%BC%91%E5%8F%B7%20%E5%88%A4%E6%B1%BA

http://www.asaho.com/jpn/bkno/2004/0809.html

2020-07-20

翻訳　62 (w)

https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%83%B5%E6%94%BF%E9%80%A0%E5%8F%8D%E7%B5%84%E5%BE%A9%E5%85%9A%E5%95%8F%E9%A1%8C

The anti-postal service privatization group reinstatement controversy refers to the issue of politicians being allowed to rejoin the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who had been previously expelled for their opposition to the Postal Service Privatization Act during a Diet session to deliberate and vote on the privatization of the postal service that took place in 2005 (known as 郵政国会).

1 Background

1.1 Reinstatement of 11 independent Diet members

1.2 Reinstatement of formal rebels to run in House of Councillors election

1.3 Re-emergence of the issue of Hiranuma Takeo's reinstatement

1.4 Overlap of candidates in six electoral districts and 2009 House of Representatives election

2 Aftermath

Background

In 2005, in a plenary session of the House of Representatives, a number of LDP lawmakers voted against the Postal Service Privatization Act, and were subsequently not given the endorsement of the LDP at the 44^th House of Representatives election for their violation of compulsory rules to adhere to the party line. The only way of becoming a member of the House of Representatives without endorsement from a political party was to run in opposition to the party's official candidate (or support candidate).

After the election, severe punishments were handed down to candidates that ran in opposition to the official candidates endorsed by the LDP, and they were urged to leave the party or face expulsion. Rebels who joined the People's New Party (Kokumin Shintо̄) and New Party Nippon were expelled, and rebel House of Representatives members who voted for Koizumi Junichirо̄ in the post-election vote to appoint the next Prime Minister were urged to leave the party.

Rebels who had been told to leave went on to support the LDP and agree to government bills with the aim of ultimately rejoining the party.

On September 26, 2006, when the role of Prime Minister and President of the LDP shifted from Koizumi Junichirо̄ to Abe Shinzо̄, 12 former rebel independent Diet members voted for Abe as leader, in a continuation of their efforts to support the LDP.

At the time, a plan to reinstate the rebel group was emerging, proposed primarily by Aoki Mikio and senior LDP members in the House of Councillors. At a meeting of influential people within the LDP held in October, the majority agreed with the plan to reinstate 12 former rebel independent Diet members. A motivation behind the plan was that the LDP needed the support of the rebel group in the upcoming 21^st House of Councillors election in 2007, as many had stable support bases in rural areas. Returning to the party as LDP Diet members also presented various benefits to the former rebels, such as being able to participate in LDP meetings and receiving party subsidies.

There were also people opposed to the reinstatement of the former rebels, particularly “assassin” Diet members who had been elected in the electoral districts of the former rebels and Diet members who had been elected for the first time on a postal service privatization ticket.

The issue created division within the LDP and its lack of resolution attracted significant attention from the media and the general public.

The former rebels were reinstated, but aware that the legitimacy of the LDP was questioned at the time of the 2005 House of Representatives election, Secretary General of the LDP Nakagawa Hidenao made a clear distinction that things had changed on behalf of the party executives, calling for the rebels to “not oppose privatizing the postal service,” and to “support the Abe administration's pledges.”

Those who agreed with the reinstatement claimed they did so as an act of humanity, rather than due to consideration of election results (such as Aoki Mikio, Chairman, General Assembly of Party Members of the House of Councillors), or that there is an inherently emotional side of politics (such as Nakagawa Shо̄ichi, Chairman of the LDP Policy Bureau). In contrast to those invoking emotional reasons to ask for unconditional reinstatement, those opposed posited logical reasons, pointing out that the LDP is not a club for friends, and that the decision should be made logically, because making emotional decisions would result in public criticism (such as Nakagawa Hidenao, Secretary General of the LDP), and sought for support of the postal service privatization to be made a condition of reinstatement. As such, it became a battle between emotional and logical arguments.

The issue of reinstating the former rebels dragged on, only drawing more public attention, to the point that it became necessary to seek understanding from the public. There were also calls for arguments about the privatization of the postal service and the justification for reinstating the former rebels to be clearly explained in a public forum.

Hiranuma Takeo, former Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, negotiated with the LDP as a representative of the former rebels and sought their unconditional reinstatement, though opposed the demands of the Secretary General of the LDP and representative of the LDP executive Nakagawa Hidenao. The negotiations between Secretary General Nakagawa and Hiranuma attracted attention, with focus also turning to the pair's past feuds from when they were both part of the Mitsuzuka faction within the LDP.

Also of interest was whether Hiranuma would change his mind, as he voted to oppose the bill in the vote on the postal service privatization bill after the House of Representatives election. Because of this, some people suggested Hiranuma should not be reinstated while 11 of the former rebels should be, rather than all 12 being reinstated at once. The former rebels regarded this plan as an abandonment of Hiranuma, and many expressed a desire that the whole group be reinstated at the same time.

It was also proposed that the former rebel independent Diet members could forgo reinstatement, form a political party and create an alliance with the LDP. This was considered to be a compromise between the LDP and the former rebels, as the LDP would not need to allow the reinstatement of the former rebels, but if more than five former rebels formed a political party, they could receive party subsidies.

It was decided that the matter of reinstatement should be concluded by December 2006 at the latest, as party subsidies are issued by the national treasury at the end of the year.

The decision was made to look over the reinstatement of the defeated former rebel group for the present, as their voting behavior had not been supportive of the Prime Minister's policy speech.

The cases of former rebels who had been expelled from the party as well as Nakamura Kishirо̄ and Suzuki Muneo, who left the LDP after separate corruption scandals, were not discussed in relation to reinstatement.

Reinstatement of 11 independent Diet members

On November 27, 2006, 12 former rebels submitted a reinstatement letter to the LDP executive. Hiranuma however refused to sign the letter. The letter vowed that the signatories would “work vigorously towards the realization of the Abe administration's pledges, including the privatization of the postal service,” and “guarantee[d] the resignation of any member who violates these pledges.” Hiranuma refused to sign on grounds that it was against his principles. Secretary General Nakagawa stated that, “It is necessary to explain to the public the reasons and other details surrounding the reinstatement at some time in the future.”

On December 4, 2006, the LDP Party Discipline Committee unanimously approved the reinstatement of 11 former rebels, a group that did not include Hiranuma. Members of House of Councillors who had cast votes against the privatization of the postal service and been handed down suspension from party positions and/or two year probationary periods of party membership suspensions had their probations reduced to a year, made retroactive to October 27.

When the 11 former rebels were reinstated, Prime Minister Abe is known to have greeted them with the words, “Welcome back,” however, support for the Abe cabinet plummeted from around 70% when Abe first assumed office to 50% as a result of the reinstatement.

The issue of reinstating the former rebels, alongside the suicide of Matsuoka Toshikatsu, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and the mishandling of pensions records, are cited as reasons for the LDP's defeat in the 21^st House of Councillors election in 2007 (resulting in the houses of the Diet being controlled by different parties from 2007 to 2009), and is also said to be the main cause of the end of the Abe cabinet.

Further complicating factors include the reinstatement occurring only a year and four months after the election that centered on the privatization of the postal service; the fact that the reinstated Diet members stated their opposition to the privatization of the postal service during the election period and after the election did not undergo a sudden change of opinion to support the privatization; and statements made by LDP leaders as well as Abe during the election campaign (such as, “Even if [the former rebels] are elected, there is nowhere they belong.”) that represented a 180 degree shift in position.

The House of Representatives seats in 2005 were allocated as follows: 296 LDP, 31 Kо̄meitо̄ Party, 113 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 9 Communist Party, 7 Socialist Party, 4 People's New Party, 18 independents.

Seats held by ruling parties (LDP and Kо̄meitо̄), totalled 409 out of 480, a 69% share. Previously, the two thirds majority needed for a bill to face another vote could have been disrupted by seven people rebelling, but after the election and the increase of 11 seats for the ruling parties, it required 18 people to rebel, thereby increasing the political power of the ruling parties. However, if the 31 Kо̄meitо̄ members voted against a bill in a plenary session, the political situation would have remained the same, with the ruling party exerting influence over less than two thirds of seats.

As a result of the reinstatement, there was an overlap of candidates in six electoral districts, with reinstated former rebels elected in single member districts and LDP members who failed to win in single member districts going on to win in proportional representation blocks. The LDP subsequently altered electoral districts at the next House of Representatives election.

Reinstatement of formal rebels to run in House of Councillors election

Although the reinstatement of the group of defeated former rebels had been put on hold, citing voting behavior that was unsupportive of the Prime Minister's policy speech, in February 2007, former rebel Etо̄ Seiichi, LDP member for Ōita first district, requested to be able to run in a proportional representation block in the 21^st regular election for the House of Councillors held in July, which was ultimately granted. Prime Minister Abe, whose policy ideas were very similar to Etо̄'s, indicated his intention to reinstate the remaining former rebels, and Secretary General Nakagawa Hidenao, who was reluctant at first, also ultimately approved the measure, stating, “Whatever position you take now, as people with the same mindset and direction as the Prime Minister, we all have to rally together.” As a result, it was reported that other defeated former rebels could be reinstated.

In an extraordinary majority vote on March 9, the LDP Party Discipline Committee voted 10 to 7 in favor of reinstating Etо̄ Seiichi. Those opposed argued it would be inconsistent to reinstate Etо̄ alone when there were other former members of the House of Representatives who lost at election and were opposed to postal service privatization, and the previous reinstatements had resulted in a drop in support for the cabinet.

The reinstatement met with opposition from Kо̄meitо̄, who were planning on winning over those who had supported Etо̄ in Ōita in the proportionally represented block. As a result, Etо̄ was forced to close the Ōita office, stop the activities of his supporters association and move his office to Tokyo.

Fujii Takao, who had been the LDP member for the Gifu fourth district, announced that he would be switching to the House of Councillors electoral district for Gifu Prefecture. As it was established party policy that non-incumbent Diet members could not be reinstated until after the conclusion of a House of Councillors election, Fujii eventually ran as an independent with LDP support. Criticism emerged from within the LDP that the treatment of Fujii was inconsistent with the reinstatement of Etо̄ Seiichi, who went on to stand as a candidate in House of Councillors election.

As Ōno Tsuyako, LDP Diet member initially elected to the House of Councillors in 1996, was already a candidate in the two candidate Gifu Prefecture electoral district, the LDP's Gifu Prefectural Chapter tried to make Ōno the official candidate and Fujii the recommended candidate, however Ōno opposed the idea, as it would amount to vote splitting. Ōno announced her retirement from politics in the February before the July 2007 election, meaning the LDP could throw its weight behind Fujii in the Gifu Prefecture electoral district.

Etо̄ Seiichi and Fujii Takao were elected amid a heavy defeat for the LDP in the House of Councillors election in 2007. On September 7, Fujii was reinstated to the LDP. Although the decline in support was mainly due to the pension controversy and the close ties between politics and money, it can be said to have started with the reinstatement controversy.

When the DPJ submitted a bill to freeze the privatization of the postal service in the 168^th Diet session, instead of voting against, Etо̄ Seiichi abstained from the vote in the plenary session of House of Councillors. Disobeying party policy yet again earned Etо̄ a stern warning from Otsuji Hidehisa, Chairman of the LDP House of Councillors' Committee.

Re-emergence of the issue of Hiranuma Takeo's reinstatement

In September 2007, it was reported that a decision had been made unofficially to reinstate Hiranuma Takeo, former Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, without him needing to write a letter pledging allegiance, like the one he had refused to sign in 2006. As a result, it became expected that the group of former rebel independents who had received notice to leave the party would all be reinstated.

Suga Yoshide was made LDP Director of Election Strategy in the first reshuffled Abe cabinet in August 2007, saying, “My job is to fire people,” and in turn, Asо̄ Tarо̄, Secretary General of the LDP, and others removed Katayama Satsuki and Satо̄ Yukari from major posts within the party (Director of Public Relations Department and Deputy Secretary General). With the Abe administration in an unstable state due to consecutive scandals involving cabinet ministers, there was a sense of impending crisis within the LDP executive that they would lose at the House of Representatives election. They decided to adopt the policy of only endorsing candidates who could win at the next election, and believed that candidates with proven abilities and results were more reliable than those that won at election on a fluke, putting the so-called “Koizumi Children” in an even tougher position for the next House of Representatives election.

On September 12, Prime Minister Abe resigned, resulting in Fukuda Yasuo taking over the position and a dramatic change in the situation. Ibuki Bunmei, Secretary General of the LDP, made a statement to the effect that the simultaneous reinstatement of the defeated former rebels requested by Hiranuma was difficult. Ultimately, Hiranuma shifted his focus from reinstatement to calling for a “third party” that was neither the LDP nor the DPJ, and in this vein launched the “Hiranuma Group,” primarily centered around former rebels who had lost at the 2008 election.

Overlap of candidates in six electoral districts and 2009 House of Representatives election

Suga Yoshihide, LDP Election Strategy Committee Vice Chairman, declared an end to the so-called “Costa Rican system” of choosing election candidates, as reinstatement of former LDP members had meant that candidates overlapped in six electoral districts. The LDP executive also indicated there would be a substantial change in candidates.

There were changes in the six electoral districts where LDP members had been reinstated, such as Hosaka Takeshi moving from the Yamanashi third district, where former rebel Ono Jirо̄ was standing, to became a candidate for the October 2008 mayoral election in the city of Kai (which he went on to win), and Satо̄ Yukari moving from the Gifu first district, where former rebel Noda Seiko was running, to the Tokyo fifth district.

There was a deepening of bad feeling between candidates reinstated in 2006 who received official endorsement and LDP candidates elected in 2005 in the three electoral districts of Yamanashi second district, Tokushima second district and Saga third district. While divisions were avoided in Tokushima second district with Shichijо̄ Akira becoming a proportional representation candidate, Nagasaki Kо̄tarо̄ of Yamanashi second district and Hirotsu Motoko of Saga third district left the party and stood in opposition to the LDP candidate, resulting in a vote splitting situation.

Even when it came to a snap election in Fukuoka eleventh district, the LDP had not been able to choose between Takeda Ryо̄ta and Yamamoto Kо̄zо̄ to become a single official candidate. Right before the public announcement of the House of Representatives election, the party turned to the Costa Rican system to designate the single member district to Takeda Ryо̄ta and the proportionally represented block to Yamamoto Kо̄zо̄, thereby avoiding a split election.

In the House of Representatives election of 2009, in electoral districts where LDP candidates were subject to the issue of overlapping candidates, there were two winners and five losers out of seven, resulting in two proportional come-back opportunities (running in a proportional representation election after losing in a single member district) and three losers. When it came to LDP candidates running solely for the proportional representation block, out of the two candidates, one won and one lost. Of the three people running in an electoral district where a former LDP candidate challenged the LDP, one won and two lost.

Aftermath

Notable people who subsequently defected or were reinstated include:

Tokuda Takeshi, the DPJ recommended candidate in the House of Representatives election of 2005,

joined the LDP on December 20, 2006;

Sakamoto Tetsushi (who voted in favor of the Postal Service Privatization Act in the 2005 Diet session) stood as an independent affiliated with LDP in the LDP candidate Matsuoka Toshikatsu's electoral district of Kumamoto third district, and two years after his election loss, in July 2007, was elected in a by-election, later joining the LDP on December 18;

as a former rebel candidate who lost at the House of Representatives election of 2005, Morioka Masahiro was reinstated, having announced his candidacy in Nara first district in May 2009.

These events did not garner as much attention nor become a problem in the same way as the previously discussed reinstatement controversy.

There were huge changes in the stance of the LDP, now led by Tanigaki Sadakazu, concerning the privatization of the postal service after their loss of power at the House of Representatives election of 2009. While the LDP conducted a review of Koizumi's structural reform, the DPJ administration submitted the “Act for Partial Revision of the Postal Service Privatization Act and others” to the Diet in April 2012, key to which was a structural review of the Japan Post group, and which was jointly submitted by the LDP.

In a reverse of fates, advocates of postal service privatization were themselves treated as rebels. Nakagawa Hidenao, Suga Yoshihide and Koizumi Jinjirо̄ rebelled at the time of the vote, with Taira Masaaki leaving his seat partway through [1]. The government, wanting to bring an end to opposition to the postal service issue within the ruling party, prioritized party unity and issued a strict warning to the four lawmakers [2].

Various lawmakers were later reinstated, including Kiuchi Minoru, who had received notice to leave the LDP in May 2012; Hiranuma Takeo, who received a great deal of attention in October 2015 over the reinstatement controversy of 2006; Koizumi Ryūji, who received notice to leave the party in October 2017; Watanuki Tamisuke, who had been expelled in November 2016 and Arai Hiroyuki, who had been expelled in September 2017. These reinstatements did not result in similar attention or uproar as previous occasions.

References

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3092372/

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=EKJKl4ZByIcC&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=house+of+representatives+japan+2005+election+327+of+480&source=bl&ots=ag3eBSZmGW&sig=ACfU3U0C2jWZNpR6V89nyMHpZx8_HT1p7A&hl=ja&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjiktWr28zqAhXUoVwKHcwSB1cQ6AEwAnoECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=house%20of%20representatives%20japan%202005%20election%20327%20of%20480&f=false

2020-07-12

翻訳　61 (w)

https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%98%AD%E5%92%8C%E9%9B%BB%E5%B7%A5%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6

The Shо̄wa Denkо̄ scandal (昭和電工事件, shо̄wa denkо̄ jiken) was a corruption scandal that occurred in 1948. It is also referred to as the Shо̄wa Denkо̄ Case (昭電事件) and the Shо̄wa Denkо̄ bribery scandal (昭電汚職、昭電疑獄).

1 Summary

2 Case history

3 Investigation results

4 GHQ conspiracy theory

Summary

Hinohara Setsuzо̄, company president of major chemical engineering firm Shо̄wa Denkо̄, bribed high government officials and management of the government financial agency in order to obtain government-financed loans from the Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB). Setsuzо̄'s activities came to light in June 1948, and resulted in the ousting of Colonel Charles Louis Kades, when rumors emerged claiming that high officials including Kades had taken bribes. Kades worked for the Government Section, a department of the GHQ (also known as SCAP, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) that was in charge of furthering Japanese democratization. It has been said that the GHQ General Staff Section (G2), headed by Major General Charles Willoughby, and which had a long standing conflict with the Government Section, was involved in operations behind the scenes in an effort to discredit Kades, a liberal, in addition to right wing thinker Miura Giichi, who assisted in Kades' ousting.

It was the police who initially discovered the wrongdoing. A team including Hatano Akira, who at the time was head of the Second Investigation Division and later went on to serve as Superintendent General of Metropolitan Police, conducted a secret investigation. They became convinced that what they found would become a huge political corruption scandal that could bring down the government, but pushed on with the investigation regardless. Over the course of the investigation they discovered that GHQ employees had also received money, and it became clear that this structural corruption involved GHQ, as well as the government and financial sector. As a result, people within GHQ who were aware of the situation applied pressure, shut police out from the investigation and engineered a situation where prosecutors had to take orders from GHQ. This was a motivating factor in the police deciding to leak information. Hatano Akira took the step of sending Christian Science Monitor reporter Gordon Walker a list of names of officials working in GHQ who were suspected of corruption. Gordon Walker immediately paid a visit to GHQ, asked if it was true that they were interfering with police activites and presented the list. It immediately put a stop to GHQ's intervention in police matters, though Gordon Walker was subsequently suddenly transferred to the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, Hatano was suddenly transferred to a different post, as was Chief Detective Fujita, and the investigation was handed from the police to prosecutors. The prosecutors' investigation did not result in any allegations made towards GHQ [5].

The arrests began with Fukuda Takeo, a Ministry of Finance bureaucrat and future Prime Minister, and О̄no Banboku, an authority in the Democratic Liberal Party and future Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party, before extending further to arrests of high ranking government official and cabinet ministers. Due to the arrests of both Kurusu Takeo, Secretary General of the Economic Stabilization Agency, and Nishio Suehiro, former deputy Prime Minister, as well as mass resignations, the cabinet of Ashida Hitoshi collapsed, resulting in Yoshida Shigeru of the Democratic Liberal Party forming a cabinet [4]. Former Prime Minister Ashida was himself also arrested, though ultimately all politicians other than Kurusu Takeo were acquitted.

Case history

1948

April 27: Bribes surrounding Shо̄wa Denkо̄'s RFB loans raised in the House of Representatives. Around the same time Shо̄wa Denkо̄ receives over 2.3 billion yen ($21 million USD) in RFB loans for the expansion of a fertilizer plant, company president Hinohara Setsuzо̄ disseminates huge amounts of money to figures in politics, government and business.

June 23: Company president Hinohara is arrested.

September 13: Fukuda Takeo, Director of the Budget Bureau at the Ministry of Finance, is arrested on suspicion of receiving 100,000 yen ($930) in bribes.

September 18: О̄no Banboku, Democratic Liberal Party adviser, is arrested on suspicion of receiving 200,000 yen ($1,800) in bribes.

September 30: Kurusu Takeo, Secretary General of the Economic Stabilization Agency, is arrested on suspicion of receiving 300,000 yen ($2,700 USD) and other items in bribes.

October 6: Nishio Suehiro, former Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Socialist Party, was arrested on suspicion of receiving 1 million yen ($9,300 USD) in bribes.

October 7: Mass resignation of the Ashida cabinet.

December 6: A plenary session of the House of Representatives grants the request for arrest warrants to be made for Ashida Hitoshi, Kitaura Keitarо̄ and Kawahashi Toyojirо̄ by a margin of 20 votes.

April 13, 1962: The Supreme Court sentenced former company president Hinohara Setsuzо̄ to one year imprisonment with a five years suspended sentence.

November 1962: Kurusu Takeo was handed down an eight month prison sentence suspended for a year and ordered to pay 1.5 million yen ($14,000 USD).

Other defendants were nearly all acquitted [6].

Investigation results

The following is a list of people who were involved in bribery surrounding loans from the RFB and Industrial Bank of Japan, in addition to the Secretary General of the Economic Stabilization Agency Kurusu Takeo and Shо̄wa Denkо̄ company president Hinohara Setsuzо̄.

1. Recipients of bribes given by company president Hinohara Setsuzо̄:

- Shigemasa Seishi, former vice minister for the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and Chairman of the Board for Nihon Hiryо̄, received 1.7 million yen ($15,000 USD) and 1 million shares

- Kurusu Takeo, Minister of State and Secretary General of the Economic Stabilization Agency, received 450,000 yen ($4,200 USD)

- Ninomiya Yoshimoto, Director of the Reconstruction Finance Bank and Vice Governor of the Japan Industrial Bank, received 1.2 million yen, house repairs worth 171,000 yen ($1500 USD) and clothes worth 32,000 yen ($290 USD)

- Tsuda Nobuhide, Technical Official for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, received 40,000 yen ($370 USD) and clothes and other goods worth 83,000 yen ($770 USD)

- Maruyama Jirо̄, managing director of Yasuda Bank, received 100,000 yen ($930 USD) and hanging scrolls worth 325,000 yen

- Fukuda Takeo, Director of the Budget Bureau at the Ministry of Finance, received 100,000 yen ($930 USD)

- Tsutomu Nomiyama, Director, First Division of the Chemical Fertilizer Department, Chemicals Bureau, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, received 60,000 yen ($560 USD)

- Yokoyama Akira, First Section Manager of Loans at Yasuda Bank Head Office, received 60,000 yen ($560 USD)

2. Recipients of bribes given by Fujii Takashi, Managing Director of Shо̄wa Denkо̄:

- Yokoyama Akira (as above), received 30,000 yen ($280 USD)

- Takabe Masaru, Finance Manager at Yasuda Bank, received 30,000 ($280 USD)

- Higuchi Shunji, Assistant Director at the Ginza Branch of Sanwa Bank, received 20,000 yen ($180 USD)

- Hashimoto Harunosuke, acting Branch Manager at the Ginza Branch of Sanwa Bank, 15,000 yen ($140 USD)

- Yokota Noboru, Branch Manager at the Ginza Branch of Sanwa Bank, received 40,000 yen ($370 USD)

GHQ conspiracy theory

There is a strong case that this scandal was utilized by GHQ G2 to remove members of the Government Section with the aim of establishing a conservative cabinet [4].

References

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=BpziAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA224&lpg=PA224&dq=hinohara+setsuzo+sentenced&source=bl&ots=Y0WAKtQ32p&sig=ACfU3U2reUEpsmwNSnUMu18ganRD5zSDZg&hl=ja&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwitn__ojsDqAhVRtXEKHfXHBVQQ6AEwAHoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=hinohara%20setsuzo%20sentenced&f=false

https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%89%E6%B5%A6%E7%BE%A9%E4%B8%80

2020-07-08

翻訳　60 (w)

https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E6%88%A6%E7%B7%9A%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6

The Popular Front Incidents (人民戦線事件, jinmin sensen jiken) refer to mass arrests made on December 15, 1937 and February 1, 1938 of university professors and scholars associated with a post-war non-communist Marxist ideology known collectively as “the workers' and farmers' faction,” or rо̄nо̄-ha, as a result of efforts made to form a united people's front against fascism in Japan called for by Communist International (Comintern) [1]. Until this point in time, arrests of left wing thinkers had been limited to members of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), but this incident saw the scope of arrests extended to non-communist Marxists and socialists. It is known as a representative example of how article one of the Public Security Preservation Law of 1925 concerning conspiracy or association was broadly interpreted [2].

1 Background

2 Case history

3 Broad interpretation and application of “conspiracy or association”

4 Not guilty verdict and aftermath

5 Verdict

Background

In July 1935, the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International was held in Moscow, where it was announced that in a change of policy, a united anti-fascist front would be formed in alliance with opposing social democratic forces [3]. In February 1936, a letter explaining the change of policy, the “Letter to Communists of Japan,” signed by Okano (Nosaka Sanzо̄) and Tanaka (Yamamoto Kenzо̄), was brought to Japan in secret via the United States [4] [5] [6].

Rо̄nо̄-ha, a collective of non-communist leftists including supporters of the magazine Rо̄nо̄, played a major role in the people's front movement in Japan [4]. The ethos of rо̄nо̄-ha was grounded in one stage revolution theory (proletariat revolution), in opposition to Comintern's two stage revolution theory (bourgeois revolution and proletariat revolution). Adherents of another school of thought called kо̄za-ha followed the route set by the Comintern [4]. In July 1936, the Metropolitan Police arrested kо̄za-ha scholars for being leaders of the JCP reconstruction despite kо̄za-ha having no such plans to reconstruct the JCP [4]. It became known as the “Communist Academy Incident” [4]. From this point on, anyone found engaging in activity related to reinstating the JCP was arrested, even if those actions were minor [4].

The internal circumstances of the arresting Special Higher Police (Tokkо̄) and thought crime prosecutors played a role in the Communist Academy Incident. At the time, people who had been targeted for arrest by the Special Higher Police and thought crime prosecutors had all but entirely disappeared [7]. Cuts to budget and staffing between 1935 to 1936 had left them trying to find new people to arrest as a way of defending the existence of the organization [7]. The anti-fascist movement experienced an upsurge after the attempted coup of February 1936, and links were made between that movement and Comintern's people's front strategy. Determining that the anti-fascist movement was linked to communism meant new people could be targeted for arrest [7]. It is within this context that the Popular Front Incidents took place.

Case history

The anti-fascist united front was a movement that included diverse ideologies, such as social democracy, liberalism, and the anti-war movement. It was the opinion of the Ministry of Justice that social democracy and liberalism were a breeding ground for communism, and subscribing to this view, the Home Ministry Police Affairs Bureau set about making arrests [2].

At 6am on December 15, 1937, police arrested 466 people in 18 prefectures across the country, including Committee Chairman of the Japan Proletarian Party Katо̄ Kanjū, central and local leaders of support organizations like the National Farmers Union and the National Council of Trade Unions, as well as scholars and critics [8]. This is known as the first People's Front Incident. On December 22, the Japan Proletarian Party and National Council of Trade Unions were declared to be illegal and forced to disband [9]. In the following year, on February 1, 1938, 38 people were arrested across nine prefectures [8], in the second People's Front Incident, sometimes referred to as the 'faculty group' [9]. This incident seemed to involve internal conflicts that were occurring at the time within the Faculty of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University [10]. It is said that Hijikata Seibi, Tanabe Tadao, Honiden Yoshio and Hashizume Akio were involved in the arrests, particularly Hashizume, who had working as a spy for the Home Ministry Police Affairs Bureau [10].

Of those arrested, there were 265 people who had connections to the Japan Proletarian Party, 174 people connected to the National Council of Trade Unions (including 42 people who also had connections to the Japan Proletarian Party), 34 people of the rо̄nо̄-ha, and 11 people in the faculty group [8]. Notable people arrested in the first Popular Front incident include Diet members Katо̄ Kanjū and Kuroda Hisao, activists Yamakawa Hitoshi, Arahata Kanson, Suzuki Mosaburо̄, Okada Sо̄ji, Sakisaka Itsurо̄, Ōmori Yoshitarо̄, and in the second Popular Front incident, Ōuchi Hyо̄e, Arisawa Hiromi, Wakimura Yoshitarо̄, Uno Kо̄zо̄, Minobe Ryо̄kichi, Sasaki Kо̄zо̄ and Eda Saburо̄.

Broad interpretation and application of “conspiracy or association”

After the arrests, examining judges contended that the Japan Proletarian Party was not an organization banned by article one of the Public Security Preservation Law, and if there was no evidence of attempts to overthrow the emperor system, then the activities would only be covered by article one, clause two of the law [11]. Though these cases were predicated on a violation of the Public Security Preservation Law, the attempted application of this law was often incorrect, and even at the time, there was also a degree of hesitation to use it [12], with others regarding it as problematic [2].

In an attempt to answer questions and avoid confusion, the Ministry of Justice produced a manual on how to apply the law. This took the form of a pamphlet called “Rо̄nо̄-ha and the Japan Proletarian Party” (“Ideological Materials Pamphlet,” edition one, March 1938), written by Supreme Court thought prosecutor Ikeda Katsu [11]. Ikeda was a leading proponent of the broad interpretation of the “conspiracy or association” aspect of the Preservation Law [13]. While there were objections that this broad interpretation of the law meant investigations and evidence gathering ran into difficulties, making it difficult to justify prosecutions, Ikeda vehemently refuted this [12]. From June to September of 1938, the Ministry of Justice gathered judges and prosecutors in various places for meetings on thought crime, and sent Ikeda and Masaki Akira, who was also a Supreme Court prosecutor, to enforce its aims [11].

The justification for a broad application of the Public Security Preservation Law was set out clearly in the aforementioned pamphlet, “Rо̄nо̄-ha and the Japan Proletarian Party.” The pamphlet made frequent use of plausible though misleading arguments focusing on the end result, as well as forced logic to justify the broad interpretation of “association or conspiracy” as stipulated by article one of the Public Security Preservation Law. The theory of results over all else is often quoted in criticism of the broad interpretation of the “association and conspiracy” aspect of the law.

Another problem with the application of the Public Security Preservation Law was that rо̄nо̄-ha was a loose term applied to people with a certain ideology, rather than an established organization [9]. The Public Security Preservation Law could not be applied in these situations, as it was ultimately a law to crack down on organizations. The activities of rо̄nо̄-ha were within the scope of legal activities, and neither did the anti-fascist movement aim to change the 'kokutai' (national essence) [9] (article one of the Public Security Preservation Law states, “Anyone who forms, or knowingly participates in, groups whose goal is to deny the system of private property or to change our national essence shall be sentenced to prison or penal servitude of up to ten years. Anyone who attempts to commit this crime also will be punished.”).

Thought prosecutors did not however pay any regard to this. Despite it being a foreign entity, they saw Comintern as an organization trying to change the kokutai, and impossibly attempted to apply domestic law to it [14]. They advanced such a broad interpretation of the Preservation Law that as long as suspects had an awareness of Comintern, or even knew what kind of organization it was, they were liable for punishment [14].

Not guilty verdict and aftermath

This forcible application of the law led to significant confusion and people being arrested for engaging in legal activities. This was due in no small part to the lack of clarity in the criteria as to whether or not to prosecute [15]. Okayama District Public Prosecutors Office questioned whether or not rо̄nо̄-ha should be recognized as an organization, and Akita District Court queried whether article one of the Public Security Preservation Law could be applied to the so-called Popular Front movement [15]. The forced arrests ultimately backfired, with not guilty verdicts being returned one after another, notably in the faculty group [15].

Discontented with this, thought prosecutors again pushed on with efforts to revise the Public Security Preservation Law in 1938 [15]. Their motive was not merely to amend the law. Thought prosecutors wanted to change the cumbersome Public Security Preservation Law as it stood to make it easier to arrest suspects, after the Special Higher Police had been forced to minimize the illegal detention and torture commonly used against suspects due to these practices being regarded as problematic within the National Diet. In addition to this, as it was not legal to apply the Public Security Preservation Law when arresting members of “similar religious organizations” in instances of emerging religions among the general public, prosecutors wanted to amend the law so this was also classified as a violation. The demands made by thought prosecutors were entwined with other factors, such as the Ministry of Justice's desire to give prosecutors the power to compel searches without the need for a warrant from the court [16][17].

Verdict

All of the people arrested in the Popular Front Incidents were charged under the Public Security Preservation Law, and while a large number (including all of the faculty group arrested in the second incident) received not guilty verdicts at a second trial, Katо̄ Kanjū, Suzuki Mosaburо̄, Yamakawa Hitoshi and others were found guilty at a second trial. The Public Security Preservation Law was repealed after World War Two, and as a result, Katо̄ and the rest were released in 1945. Research in 1970 established the following judgments were made [18].

Yamakawa Hitoshi

First trial judgment of September 21, 1941

Prosecutor's recommended sentence: 7 years

Sentence: 5 years in prison

Total pre-sentencing detention: 100 days

Second trial judgment of September 25, 1944

Sentence: 3 years in prison

Total pre-sentencing detention: 100 days

Final appeal judgment of November 7, 1945

Released due to repeal of the Public Security Preservation Law

Katо̄ Kanjū

First trial judgment of September 30, 1942

Sentence: 3 years in prison

Total pre-sentencing detention: 650 days

Second trial judgment : guilty

Final appeal: released

Suzuki Mosaburо̄

First trial judgment of September 30, 1942

Sentence: 5 years in prison

Second trial judgment of September 25, 1944

Sentence: 2 years 6 months in prison

Total pre-sentencing detention: 150 days

Final appeal judgment of November 8, 1945: release

Ōmori Yoshitarо̄

Died in July 1940 after being granted bail

First trial judgment of October 30, 1940: case dismissed

Arahata Kanson

Pretrial hearing judgment of December 28, 1939: put to trial

Sakisaka Itsurо̄

First trial judgment of September 21, 1942

Sentence: 2 years in prison

Arisawa Hiromi

First trial judgment of September 28, 1942

Sentence: 2 years in prison, 3 years suspended sentence